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Abstract 
This paper adds new empirical evidence to the political economy literature of economic reform. One 
of the main contributions of this paper is the development of a novel methodology to identify 
privatisations. The methodology is a combination of the Bai & Perron structural break filter, and 
validation of the breaks identified by this filter using de jure evidence of reforms. 21 de facto 
healthcare financing privatisations are identified in a sample of 23 OECD countries. It is analysed 
which factors trigger or hinder these privatisations. Robust evidence is found in favour of the ‘crises 
induce reform hypothesis’. That is, severe economic recessions, high levels of unemployment and 
high interest rates on government debt trigger privatisations. Contrary to theory and conventional 
wisdom, robust evidence is found that political factors do not have an impact. Ideology, government 
or political fractionalisation, or major cabinet changes are not found to significantly affect the 
likelihood of healthcare financing privatisations.  
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1. Introduction 
This study quantitatively analyses the political and economic determinants of healthcare financing 
privatisations, an endeavour not pursued previously. Given the economic magnitude of the healthcare 
sector this is a noticeable omission. In 2010 average public expenditure on healthcare in OECD 
countries was almost 8 % of GDP (OECD.org). A successful healthcare financing privatisation can 
reduce the fiscal burden of a country, improving the sustainability of government finances. Thus, this 
study is not only related to the literature on the determinants of privatisations (e.g. Bortolotti & 
Pinotti 2008; Roberts & Saeed 2012), but also to the literature on the determinants of fiscal 
adjustments (e.g. Alesina & Argdana 2012; Lavigne 2011). Healthcare privatisations are often a 
matter of political controversy. Hence, we expect that both political and economic factors drive 
privatisations. Therefore, it is asked whether political and/or economic factors impact the likelihood 
of de facto healthcare financing privatisations in OECD countries? 
It is likely that research in this area is lacking due to the absence of a coherent methodology to 
identify gradual, but significant healthcare privatisations. A main contribution of this paper is the 
development of such a methodology. In the literature on economic reform at least two 
complementary views exist on which kind of data ideally should be used to measure reform. The first 
view, expressed in Campos & Horváth (2012), holds that economic outcome data and policy input 
data never should be mixed. The reason is that a failure to separate the two is likely to cause 
imprecise measurement of both timing and impact of reform. The second view, expressed in Rodrik 
(1996), holds that only policy input should be used to measure reform. The argument is that factors 
outside policymakers’ control will impact economic data. Hence, only policy input data is a valid 
proxy for reform according to this view.  
Here, a novel sequential approach is taken that utilises both economic outcome data and policy input 
data without mixing it. First, the Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) (B&P) structural break filter is applied to 
detect statistically significant privatisations. Then, the detected privatisations are validated using 
evidence of de jure reforms. Selecting one of the two steps alone when measuring reforms can lead 
to either: 1) Detection of changes that are not policy induced, and thus, do not qualify as reforms. 2) 
Identification of de jure reforms that did not have a significant impact, and thus, do not qualify as 
‘successful’ reforms. The methodology detects de facto privatisations, that is, statistically significant 
policy induced shifts from public to private financing of healthcare.  
Using this improved measure of reform allows us to rigorously test some of the usual suspects that 
are believed to determine whether economic reforms are initiated or delayed. To that end, the 
random-effects binary outcome logistic estimator is applied. Controlling for economic factors and 
duration dependence several interesting empirical results are found. First, the results suggest that 
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severe economic crises trigger healthcare financing privatisations. Second, no evidence is found that 
pure political factors impact the likelihood of financing healthcare privatisations. These results are 
robust to different definitions of privatisation. Furthermore, the main findings are robust to different 
proxies for the hypothesised political determinants. Thus, the overall contribution of this paper is a 
coherent quantitative analysis of the determinants of de facto healthcare financing privatisations in 
OECD countries.  
Section 2 develops the hypotheses while section 3 outlines the data and the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 presents the baseline empirical results and section 5 gives robustness analyses. The paper 
ends with a conclusion in section 6.   
 
2. Hypotheses 
In this section the hypotheses are developed. They are not derived from a single underlying 
theoretical model for healthcare financing reform because no such model exists. Instead, they are 
derived from related literature on the political economy of reform and privatisation.  
Perhaps the most common view among scholars is that an economic crisis is a necessary and maybe 
sufficient condition to trigger reform. Nonetheless, the hypothesis has not been subjected thorough 
empirical testing. This lack of research can be due to several causes. First, when a hypothesis enters 
the realm of  ‘conventional wisdom’ empirical testing often ends (Drazen & Easterly 2001). Second, 
Rodrik (1996) argues that the ‘crises induce reform hypothesis’ is a tautology, which means that 
there is nothing to test. “Reform naturally becomes an issue only when policies are perceived not to 
be working. A crisis is just an extreme case of policy failure. That reform should follow crisis, then, 
is no more surprising than smoke following a fire” (Rodrik 1996, p. 27). However, economic crises 
can take different forms and differences in the severity of crises can have a different impact on 
reform probability. For example, recessions may trigger healthcare reform while below average 
economic growth rates does not. Furthermore, the effect of crises in sparking reform may also 
depend critically on what sort of reform is being considered (Drazen & Easterly 2001). So, the 
hypothesis is falsifiable.  
Two common explanations for the ‘economic crises induce reform hypothesis’ exist. The first is 
based on the presumption that when significant political opposition to reform exists, an economic 
crisis may overcome reform resistance by convincing the opposition that something needs to be done 
(Drazen 2000). The second is centred on the observation that ex-ante uncertainty about the economic 
outcome of reform often generates resistance to reform. An economic crisis raises the cost of not 
reforming, effectively decreasing political opposition (Fernandez & Rodrik 1991). These arguments 
lead to the first hypothesis. 
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H1: The likelihood of healthcare financing privatisations increases when the economy is in a 
severe state of crisis.  
Conventionally, right-wing market-oriented governments are thought to be inclined towards 
privatisation and liberalisation of public sector enterprises. In political economy, such an effect is 
typically referred to as the ‘partisan politics hypothesis’. To what extent do left- and right-wing 
politicians or parties provide policies that reflect the preferences of their electorates? According to 
the conventional approach right-wing governments implement policies that favour the preferences of 
relatively high-income voters, whereas left-wing governments implement policies that favour the 
preferences of low-income voters (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1987). Empirical studies do not provide 
robust evidence for the hypothesis concerning privatisations (see Bortolotti & Pinotti 2008; Roberts 
& Saeed 2012). In fact, the empirical literature on the determinants of fiscal adjustments suggests 
that left-wing governments are likely to introduce reforms that normally are associated right-wing 
policies (see Tavares 2004).  
This can be explained theoretically by the “Nixon goes to China” effect. Cukierman & Tommasi 
(1998) show that right-wing governments will find it harder to credibly signal that right-wing 
policies will be beneficial. The same holds for left-wing governments and left-wing policies. 
Governments are prone to become victims of their own ideology – only governments of the 
unexpected ‘political colour’ can credibly signal that a policy is expected to be beneficial. It is 
reasonable to expect that governments have private information about the highly uncertain economic 
outcome of healthcare privatisations. This asymmetric information is caused, for example, by access 
to expert knowledge. These arguments lead to the second hypothesis.  
H2: The likelihood of healthcare financing privatisations increases when a left-wing 
government is in office 
The two previous hypotheses concern factors that trigger privatisations. However, it is interesting to 
investigate whether there are factors that diminish the probability of reform. It is often observed that 
welfare-enhancing policies are delayed. This can be explained by the ‘war of attrition hypothesis’, 
which state that political opponents play a ‘waiting game’. The basic insight from the Alesina & 
Drazen (1991) model is that governments will postpone unpopular reforms, even if postponement is 
sub-optimal for social welfare, until the ‘political’ costs of reform has fallen below the ‘political’ 
benefits of postponing it. This implies that more heterogeneous governments will be less keen to 
reform public enterprises because they have a more heterogeneous constituency to please. They will 
face higher costs, in terms pleasing their electorate, and hence, postpone reforms. Thus, large 
coalition governments will find it more difficult to agree on reforms compared to more homogeneous 
governments. Small groups can use their veto power to block reforms if the change in distribution of 
economic goods resulting from the reform will be too costly, in terms of preferences of their 
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electorates. This argument also holds in the case of privatisations (Lora 2000). This explains the third 
hypothesis.  
H3: The likelihood of healthcare financing privatisation decreases when governments are more 
fractionalised  
Lora (2000) point-out that the literature on the timing of reform offers little explanation of the 
apparent importance of one factor that seems to be the simplest reasons for reform, namely a change 
of government. Based on case studies, Haggard and Webb (1994) argue that a window of opportunity 
opens after elections. This can be exploited by newly elected governments, which “typically enjoy a 
period in which the costs of adjustment can be traded against political gains” (Haggard & Webb 
1994, p.  8). Such a window of opportunity could, in relation to healthcare reform, be the 
interpretation made by a newly elected government that public healthcare expenditure have, or will 
become unsustainable unless significant efforts to curb the costs are initiated. This explains the 
fourth hypothesis.  
H4: The likelihood of healthcare financing privatisation increases when a newly elected 
government or government executive is in office  
 
3. Data and empirical strategy  
In this section the methodology used to detect healthcare-financing privatisations is presented. 
Furthermore, the independent variables and the econometric technique used in the estimations are 
discussed.  
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Identifying privatisations 
There exist two groups of definitions of privatisations in the literature, a broad and a narrow one. The 
broad definition concerns overall shifts in the boundary between public versus private involvement in 
the economic sphere (e.g. Vickers & Yarrow 1991). The narrow definition concerns shifts in 
ownership (e.g. Saltman 2003). The drawback of the broad definition is that it is problematic to 
operationalize. The drawback of the narrow definition is that it fails to capture shifts from the public 
to the private domain when no shift in ownership takes place. This is often the case with healthcare-
financing privatisations (see appendix 1a). As shown below, we can measure public versus private 
sector involvement instead of ownership. And, as discussed in the introduction, we need to make sure 
that shifts in involvement are both policy induced and has a statistically significant impact. 
Therefore, a de facto healthcare financing privatisation is defined as: A statistically significant policy 
induced shift from public to private sector financing of healthcare services.  
What we would like to measure is public versus private funds incurred to healthcare - from which 
pocket is healthcare expenditure paid, public or private? The historical ratio yit of public healthcare 
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expenditure relative to total healthcare expenditure (public + private) in country i at time t can be 
used to identify privatisations.1 This ratio is calculated as: 
 
y
it
=
publicfunds
it
publicfunds
it
+ privatefunds
it
. It 
can be interpreted as the percentage of public financing of total spending. Hence, we have a measure 
of public relative to private financing of heath care services.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used to construct the dependent variable 
Variable  obs. mean st.dev. min. max. source: 
Public healthcare expenditure % of GDP 932 5.46 1.70 0.84 9.74 OECD.org 
Private healthcare expenditure % of GDP 942 2.02 1.39 0.11 9.31 OECD.org 
Total healthcare expenditure  % of GDP (private + total) 931 7.50 2.26 1.49 17.67 Calculated 
Public relative to total expenditure, yit 931 0.73 0.13 0.22 0.98 Calculated 
All available observations for the 23 OECD countries between 1960-2010 have been used. See table 2 for exact sample periods.  
 
The idea, then, is to apply structural break testing to identify significant shifts in yit. A structural 
break is the timing of a fundamental change in the Data Generating Process (DGP), for example as a 
result of an economic reform (Hansen 2001).2 However, a structural break can be caused by other 
factors, such as an exogenous shift in consumer preferences or relative price movements. Thus, the 
detected structural breaks needs to be validated using de jure evidence of reforms. If a change in 
policy causes a significant part of healthcare financing to shift from (to) the public to (from) the 
private sector it is a de facto privatisation (nationalisation). 
Perhaps the most well-known structural break test is the Chow-test. A noticeable feature of this test 
is that it is limited to test the hypothesis of whether a time series contains a single structural break. 
To use the test one has to split the sample at the point in time where a priori information leads one to 
suspect a break and then use F-tests to determine whether subsample parameters are significantly 
different. For the application at hand, de jure evidence gives a priori information of several structural 
breaks in each time series, up to 25 in some cases (see HSiT country reports). This means that the 
time series would have to be split into a large number of subsamples on which the Chow-test could 
be performed. This is infeasible because the time series are not long enough when a priori 
information leads us to suspect so many breaks. Furthermore, there is often a time lag before a de 
jure reform manifests itself in the data; institutions are rigid (Acemoglu et al. 2006). This means that 
the division of the time series into subsamples would be arbitrary.        
The feasible approach is to start from the economic data and then use de jure evidence for validation. 
Hence, the number and timing of structural breaks are treated as unknown a priori. The econometric 
                                                        
1 Public healthcare expenditure is defined as: “health expenditure incurred by public funds. Public funds are state, regional and 
local Government bodies and social security schemes. Public capital formation on health includes publicly financed investment 
in health facilities plus capital transfers to the private sector for hospital construction and equipment” (OECD.org). 
Private healthcare expenditure is defined as: “Privately funded part of total health care expenditure. Private sources of funds 
include out-of-pocket payments (both over-the-counter and cost-sharing), private insurance programs, charities and 
occupational health care” (OECD.org). 
2 Seminal examples of structural breaks are: the unification of Germany, and the introduction of a common European monetary 
policy.  
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literature on detection of an unknown number of structural breaks of unknown timing is relatively 
sparse. Liu et al. (1997) suggest a method for pure structural changes, i.e. all parameters included are 
subject to changes. Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) develop a more general method for this purpose. Their 
method also allows the inclusion of parameters that are not subject to shifts, of which the pure 
structural change model applied here is a special case. The assumptions of the B&P-filter are less 
restrictive. Therefore, the B&P-filter is applied to identify structural breaks.      
In order to define privatisations (and nationalisations) in the context of the B&P-filter consider a 
model with m possible structural breaks in an OLS regression framework that takes the form:  
                                                                                                     (t=1,...,T ,   j=1,…,m+1) 
Where yt is the dependent variable, in this case the time series of public relative to total healthcare 
expenditure for each country considered. δj is a vector of estimated coefficients (constants) of which 
there are m+1, i.e. δj is the mean at the different segments of the time series yt. ut is the error term. 
The segments generate a stepwise linear route through the times series yt and give m structural 
breaks. Fig. 1 provides a graphical exposition where the j=6 segments, or regimes are represented by 
dashed lines and the m=5 structural breaks are represented by dotted lines. A downward (upward) 
regime shift is detected as a potential privatisation (nationalisation), for which validation using de 
jure evidence is required. See appendix 1a for all time series of countries included. 
Fig. 1: Structural breaks in healthcare financing source: The case of Austria 
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The data used to generate fig. 1 has 51 observations, the trimming parameter was set at h=5 i.e. at least 5 periods must pass 
between consecutive breaks. See main text for an explanation.  
  
The idea underlying the B&P-filter is straightforward.3 It generates the segmented route through the 
series that generates the lowest Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) up to a maximum number of 
                                                        
3
 The process underlying the algorithm is straightforward. First, it searches for all possible sets of breaks up to a maximum 
number of breaks, restricted by the trimming parameter chosen, and determines for each number of breaks the set that minimises 
the SSR. Then a series of F-tests determine whether the improved fit produced by allowing an additional break is sufficiently 
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breaks. The maximum number of breaks is restricted by a trimming parameter h, which specifies a 
minimum number of observations that has to occur between consecutive breaks. In the context of fig. 
1 the segments can be thought of as regimes where yt fluctuates around the constant mean δj. A shift 
to a new regime is unlikely to happen by chance, dependent on the test-size employed. Thus, a 
regime shift implies that the underlying DGP has been altered generating a structural break.  
When applying the B&P-filter several test procedures are possible (see Bai & Perron 1998, 2003 or 
Zeileis et al. 2003). Here the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is chosen to select the optimal 
number of m+1 segments. Information criteria are often used for model selection, which in this case 
means selection of the m number of breakpoints. Bai & Perron (2003) argue that the Akaike 
Information Criterion usually overestimates the number of breaks, but that the BIC is a suitable 
selection procedure in many situations. Furthermore, when applying the B&P-filter a choice has to be 
made concerning the size of the trimming parameter h. If the times series do not exhibit 
autocorrelation or heteroskedaticity any trimming will work regardless of sample size (Bai & Perron 
2003). However, when finite samples that do exhibit autocorrelation or heteroskedaticity are used the 
trimming needs to be increased. Here a trimming of h=5 is chosen because it generates the best fit 
with de jure evidence while still being econometrically sound. The outcome of using a more 
conservative trimming of h=6 can be found in appendix 1a. Autocorrelation and potential 
heteroskedasticity is modelled non-parametrically by running the filter using a Heteroskedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.4 Antoshin et al. 
(2008) show that HAC errors generally deal with autocorrelation better than parametric modelling.  
The outcome of running the B&P-filter on 23 OECD countries can be found in column 3 in table 2. 
1960-2010 is selected as sample period. For some countries data is unavailable for the whole period. 
In that case the longest data period available is used, see column 2 for exact sample periods.  
It is possible that factors outside control of the policy-maker move the ratio significantly and hence 
look like a reform when it in fact was not. Therefore, it is checked whether they are likely to be the 
result of planned policy. See column 4 in table 2 for the outcome of this analysis, and table 1a in the 
appendix for a detailed description of the related de jure reforms.   
In sum, the analysis reveals that 21 of the 33 detected privatisations can be validated using evidence 
of de jure reforms. We are therefore confident that these 21 structural breaks are the result of planned 
policy, and therefore match the definition of a de facto healthcare financing privatisation. Second, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
large, compared to what can be expected randomly, on the basis of the asymptotic distribution derived in Bai & Perron (1998). 
Starting with a H0 of no breaks, sequential tests of k vs. k+1 breaks allow one to determine the appropriate number of breaks in a 
data series. Alternatively, the BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) works well if there is evidence of at least one break. After 
determining the appropriate number of breaks the program extracts the corresponding break dates of the optimal sequential route. 
The trimming parameter h is expressed either as a fixed number of observations, or a percentage of the number of observations. 
Autocorrelation, trending time series and non-constant errors are permitted (Bai & Perron 2003). 
4 Choosing the trimming to be a fixed number of observations instead of a percentage of the sample size has the implication that 
the percentage of the sample size automatically is increased for shorter samples. Bai & Perron (2003) argue that shorter samples 
exhibiting autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity calls for larger trimmings in percentage of the sample size.    
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time lag is present between the de jure reforms and the detected economic outcome of those. A 
change in policy does not manifest itself immediately as an economic outcome. That is, there is 
evidence of ‘rigid institutions’ (Acemoglu et al. 2006). In most cases a time lag of one year is present 
(see appendix 1a).  
Table 2: Identified privatisations  
Country Sample period Detected Privatisations  De facto privatisations  
Australia 1969-2009   
Austria  1960-2010 1968; 1988 1968; 1988 
Belgium 1995-2010   
Canada 1970-2010 1985; 1993 1985; 1993 
Denmark 1971-2010 1983; 1989  
Finland 1960-2010 1992 1992 
France 1990-2010 2005 2005 
Germany 1970-2010 1982; 1997; 2003 1997; 2003 
Greece 1987-2010 1993 1993 
Iceland 1960-2010 1983; 1991; 1996 1991 
Ireland 1960-2010 1984  
Italy 1988-2010 1993 1993 
Japan 1960-2009   
Luxembourg  1975-2009 1981; 1999 1999 
Netherlands 1972-2002 1997 1997 
New Zealand 1970-2010 1989 1989 
Norway 1960-2010 1979; 1988 1988 
Portugal 1970-2010 1981  
Spain 1960-2010 1988; 1994 1988; 1994 
Sweden 1970-2010 1984; 1990; 1995; 2000 1995; 2000 
Switzerland 1985-2010   
United Kingdom 1960-2010 1981; 1986; 1996 1981; 1986 
United States 1960-2010   
Data source for detected privatisations: OECD.org, Economic Outlook nr. 90. West German data is used prior 1990 for Germany.  
Data source for validated privatisations: HSiT (Healthcare Systems in Transition) country reports (see appendix for details).  
 
The methodology used to detect privatisations generates a binary variable. Years in which a 
privatisation is detected are coded as 1, the remaining years as 0. This constitutes the dependent 
variable used in the estimations that follow.  
 
3.2.  Explanatory variables 
To test hypothesis 1 three commonly applied indicators of economic crisis are used. First, if public 
debt is at high levels it is reasonable to expect that this positively will impact the pressure to privatise 
fiscally burdensome sectors of the economy, such as healthcare financing. However, what matters is 
not the level of public debt as such, but whether financial markets judge the debt to be sustainable. 
This we can call a sovereign debt crisis effect. The dummy variable debt crisis is used to capture this 
effect. It is defined as an interest rate on long-term government debt in country i at time t, above 
11.42 = the sample mean plus one standard deviation. Debt crisis could be captured in other ways, 
for example using the Laeven & Valencia (2008) sovereign debt crisis indicator. However, in their 
dataset a debt crisis is defined as actual default or restructuring of public debt. This definition is too 
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strict as it is reasonable to expect that government will react to high interest on government debt with 
reforms, before actually defaulting on their debt. Furthermore, only very few of these instances are 
observed in OECD countries in the sample period using Laeven & Valencia (2008).  
Second, poor macroeconomic performance is another commonly used measure for economic crisis. 
Economic growth rates capture this effect. Specifically the dummy variable annual recession is used. 
It is defined as a whole year in which accumulated economic growth is negative. The reason not to 
use the common definition of a recession (two or more consecutive quarters of negative economic 
growth) is that we want to capture severe economic growth crises. A country might experience a 
recession during a period of a year, but still end up with a positive growth rate annually. When the 
crisis is only mild and/or transitory it might not call for strong policy action.        
A third variable commonly related to economic crisis is the unemployment rate. The dummy variable 
job crisis is used to capture this. It is defined as an unemployment rate in country i at time t, above 
9.57 = the sample mean plus one standard deviation. Ideally, one would control for differences in 
structural unemployment. However, structural unemployment varies significantly over time and no 
annual estimates for the sample period exist (see Turner et al. 2001). In most OECD countries, an 
unemployment rate above 9.5% would be viewed as an indicator of severe economic crisis.  
All three measures for economic crises are expected to generate positive significant coefficients.  
To test hypothesis 2 the Government ideology index proposed by Potrafke (2009) is used. This 
measures ideology on a left-right scale with five points, the measure goes from 1-5; where 1 is right-
wing politicians in 2/3 or more of the parliament or cabinet seats, 2 is right-wing politicians in 
between 1/3 and 2/3 of the seats, 3 is if the share of centre parties is 50%, or if the left-wing and 
right-wing parties form a coalition government that is not dominated by one side or the other. 4 and 5 
is symmetric to 1 and 2, counted in seats taken by left-wing politicians in the parliament or cabinet. 
Years in which the government has changed are labelled according to the government that was in 
office for the longest time that year. The measure is consistent over time, but it does not attempt to 
capture links between sister parties in different countries (Potrafke 2009). According to hypothesis 2, 
a positive significant coefficient is expected.  
To test hypothesis 3 the Government fractionalization measure from the World-Bank database on 
political institutions is used. It measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies from the 
government parties will be of different parties (Beck et al. 2001). That is, how many different parties 
are parts of the coalition and how large are the individual coalition parties relative to all seats taken 
by the coalition. When the measure increases the degree of government fractionalization increases. 
According to hypothesis 3, a negative significant coefficient is expected.   
To test hypothesis 4 the variable Major Cabinet Changes from (Banks 2011) is used. It addresses the 
issue of whether a reform is more likely when a new government, or a government executive is in 
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place. The variable is defined as the number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 
new ministers assume 50% of the cabinet posts. According to hypothesis 4, a positive significant 
coefficient is expected.  
Table 3: Hypothesis summary table 
Hypothesis Variables used  Expected 
sign 
1. The likelihood of healthcare financing privatisations 
increases when the economy is in a state of crisis 
Debt crisis, annual recession and job 
crisis 
+ 
2. The likelihood of healthcare privatisation increases when 
a left-wing government is in office 
Government ideology, The Potrafke 
index 
+ 
3. The likelihood of healthcare privatisation decreases when 
governments are more politically fractionalised  
Fragmentation of governments, The 
World-Bank.  
_ 
4. The likelihood of healthcare privatisation increases when 
a newly elected government is in office 
Major cabinet changes from Banks 
(2011) 
+ 
 
3.3 Control variables  
To build a trustworthy empirical model some control variables are crucial. Factors impacting the 
likelihood of healthcare financing privatisations through costs and funding, while being correlated 
with the main variables of interest must be included. Shirley and Walsh (2000 p. 44) assert: “Instead 
of maximizing its own rents and power, the government places a priority on efficiency. It can be 
argued that governments that engage in privatisation are not the ones that seek only rents and 
power.” Specifically, demand- and supply-side factors for healthcare are expected to affect the 
efficiency of the sector, and hence the likelihood of privatisations. On the demand side an aging 
population will affect the level of spending of the healthcare sector adversely due to increased 
demand for healthcare (Oxley & MacFarlan 1995). An aging population may therefore have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of privatisation. Demographic factors are approximated by the 
percentage of the population over 65 years of age. On the supply side, technological change, in the 
form of new drugs, equipment and techniques, medical personnel and facilities, are expected to affect 
efficiency (Oxley & MacFarlan 1995). However, the effect of technological change is unclear. 
Supply of new technology will increase costs, but at the same time make medical treatment more 
effective. Nonetheless, it is expected to affect the likelihood of privatisation. Technological change is 
approximated by potential years of life lost, which is closely but inversely related to life expectancy 
at birth. Furthermore, public financing can take place through inflation. Governments can use their 
power to issue new money to finance fiscal expenditures. Because inflation is significantly correlated 
with the government interest rate, it needs to be controlled for. This concludes the political and 
economic variables included in the empirical model. Table 4 shows summary statistics and data 
sources and table 5 presents the correlation matrix of the variables described.  
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Table 4: Summary statistics and data source 
Variable  obs. mean st.dev. min. max. source 
Government ideology 1101 2.86 0.88 1 4 Potrafke (2009) 
Government fractionalisation 789 0.28 0.28 0 0.83 Beck et al. (2001) 
Major cabinet changes 715 0.38 0.54 0 3 Banks (2011) 
Government interest rate, long-term debt 995 7.66 3.76 1.00 29.74 OECD.org 
Growth rate 706 3.11 2.51 -6.37 13.06 OECD.org 
Unemployment rate 719 5.94 3.63 0.08 19.11 OECD.org 
Inflation rate 718 5.91 7.17 -0.90 83.95 OECD.org 
Demographics  1173 12.96 2.87 5.70 23.00 OECD.org 
Technological change 1060 75.72 3.41 62.7 83 OECD.org 
All available observations for the 23 OECD countries between 1960-2010 have been used. 
 
As shown in table 1a in the appendix, the policy change in the vast majority of cases occurs one year 
prior to the detected privatisation. Political variables are therefore lagged one year, so that the 
political conditions at the time of policy change match. Economic variables are not lagged. The 
reason is that economic conditions matter after the reform has passed the legislature. If, for example, 
an economic crisis ends shortly after a reform passed, then it is likely that the reform will be reversed 
or not even implemented.  
Table 5: Correlation between explanatory variables 
Variable I II III IV V VI VII IIX IX 
Ideologyt-1 1.00         
Fractionalisationt-1 -0.144 1.00        
Major Cabinet changest-1 -0.010 -0.070 1.00       
Gov. interest rate -0.025 0.017 0.088 1.00      
Growth rate 0.001 -0.017 -0.037 -0.055 1.00     
Unemployment rate 0.065 -0.161 0.051 -0.073 -0.037 1.00    
Inflation rate -0.023 0.063 0.067 0.878 -0.052 -0.206 1.00   
Demographics 0.195 0.063 -0.010 -0.418 -0.165 0.111 -0.387 1.00  
Technological change 0.009 -0.220 0.049 0.499 -0.053 -0.015 0.408 -0.418 1.00 
Number of observations: 539 
 
The sample period differs across countries either because of missing data for the dependent or 
explanatory variables. There are basically two options to proceed in that case, either make the panel 
balanced by excluding countries or certain periods, or perform the estimations with an unbalanced 
panel. The main question is whether observations are missing in a random way, i.e. is selection 
attrition exogenous? If observations are deleted to obtain a balanced panel we lose observations in a 
way that is equally random/non-random as performing the estimations with an unbalanced panel. 
Either some countries have to be deleted, or the time dimension will be severely restricted. 
Therefore, the estimations are done using the unbalanced panel in order to maximise the number of 
observations under the assumption the attrition is exogenous. The trimming parameter h=5 used 
when running the B&P-filter has the implication that privatisations cannot be identified at the first 
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and last four observations. Therefore, these are not used in the estimation, as this would bias the 
results.  
 
3.5 Estimation strategy 
The methodology presented in section 3.1 is used to identify healthcare financing privatisations. The 
identified privatisations are used as dependent variable in limited dependent variable logistic 
regressions. In the case of a binary dependent variable the observational rule can be explained by an 
underlying latent variable, namely 
 
if we observe a privatisation, i.e. . In terms of the 
underlying latent variable this means that the government only decides to privatise when the 
(expected) benefit from doing so is positive, if  we will not observe a privatisation, i.e. . 
When the random-effects estimator is applied  is interpreted as the government’s 
inclination to privatise. xit is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated and εit is a vector of random errors. The probability of privatisation is: 
 where F is the logistic cumulative 
distribution function that ensures that probability of reform is bounded between zero and one.  
The main question is whether the included explanatory variables are correlated with time invariant 
country specific effects. If this is the case the random effects estimator is inconsistent due to omitted 
variable bias. However, if there is no correlation between the explanatory variables and the country 
specific effects the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient, and hence the preferred 
estimator (Baltagi 2008). 
The Hausman-test is commonly used to test whether it can be assumed that the explanatory variables 
and the fixed-effects are uncorrelated. In this specific case the Hausman-test often fails due to a non-
positive definite differenced variance matrix. Therefore, an alternative test is applied. Specifically, 
we create country specific averages over time for each explanatory variable, and then use these as 
additional controls in a random-effects model. A Wald-test can then be used to for joint significance 
of the averages. This also implies that we assume that the fixed-effects are a linear function of the 
explanatory variables (Mundlak 1978).  
Furthermore, duration dependence in panel models with a binary dependent variable is a well-known 
problem. If it is not taken into consideration wrong inference is likely. Maximum likelihood 
estimators rely on the assumption that the probability of privatisation within countries is independent 
over time. Beck et al. (1998) show that time-series cross-sectional data (panel data) with a binary 
dependent variable is identical to grouped duration data, and propose a simple method by which the 
temporal dependence can be tested for and corrected. The method is based on the construction of a 
set of dummy variables counting the length of the spell of no privatisation at every observation, 
counting from the last year of privatisation. The intuition is that the length of the spell has an impact 
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on the probability that a privatisation will occur. Including these spell dummies has a serious 
drawback; they take up many degrees of freedom. To mitigate this problem, Beck et al. (1998) 
propose the construction of three cubic splines. These are polynomial functions that mimic the spell 
dummies by creating a smoothened function of the otherwise non-smooth function for duration 
dependence. Additionally, they propose to include a variable that counts the number of previous 
privatisations, and a variable that counts the length of the spell since the previous privatisation. All 
three suggestions are included in the estimations (see also Mierau et al. 2007).  
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 6 shows the results of the baseline random-effects estimates. In the baseline specification the 
validated detected (de facto) privatisations are used as dependent variable. Model (1) includes the 
variables testing for the ‘economic crises induce reform hypothesis’, the economic control variables 
and the variables modelling duration dependence. The variables testing the political hypotheses are 
added individually in models (2), (3) and (4). In model (5) all variables are included. The main 
finding is that the main trigger of healthcare financing privatisations is economic crises. Job crisis, 
debt crisis and annual recession all have a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of 
healthcare financing privatisations. These findings are consistent in all model specifications. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that political factors impact the likelihood of healthcare financing 
privatisations. Neither, ideology, government fractionalisation or new governments are significantly 
different from zero in any of the specifications. The economic controls are jointly significant at 
around the 5% level in all specifications. The same holds for the duration variables, this provides 
evidence that duration dependence should be taken into account. The number of observations differs 
from model (1) to (5). As explained, this is caused by the absence of data on the political variables. 
The p-value of the Wald-test of the Mundlak (1978) averages provides evidence that the random-
effects specification is consistent, and hence the most efficient estimator.  
Table 6: Baseline specification, random-effects estimates.  
Dependent variable: De facto privatisations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Job crisis 1.575*** 1.566*** 1.511*** 1.576*** 1.527*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Debt crisis 1.851** 1.778** 1.790** 1.857** 1.698* 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.040) (0.032) (0.052) 
Annual recession  1.727*** 1.796*** 1.731*** 1.726*** 1.790*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Government ideologyt-1  0.229   0.222 
  (0.432)   (0.473) 
Government fractionalisationt-1   -0.398  -0.137 
   (0.709)  (0.904) 
Major cabinet changest-1    -0.050 -0.064 
    (0.925) (0.903) 
Inflation -0.271** -0.272** -0.276** -0.271** -0.273** 
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 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) 
Demographics 0.101 0.097 0.107 0.101 0.097 
 (0.421) (0.443) (0.395) (0.419) (0.451) 
Technological change -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.368) (0.442) (0.445) (0.372) (0.565) 
Spline 1 0.023* 0.021 0.022* 0.022* 0.021 
 (0.078) (0.105) (0.089) (0.092) (0.107) 
Spline 2 -0.016* -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* -0.015* 
 (0.061) (0.081) (0.068) (0.070) (0.083) 
Spline 3 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.052) (0.066) (0.055) (0.056) (0.068) 
Number of previous privatisations -0.659 -0.643 -0.785 -0.667 -0.694 
 (0.227) (0.243) (0.205) (0.222) (0.270) 
Time since last privatisation 0.769 0.719 0.734 0.739 0.707 
 (0.109) (0.142) (0.134) (0.132) (0.149) 
Constant -5.335* -6.088* -5.137 -5.235 -6.071* 
 (0.097) (0.074) (0.120) (0.105) (0.095) 
      
Observations 634 615 539 619 539 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Log-likelihood -64.51 -64.16 -64.23 -64.47 -63.96 
Wald-test of Mundlak averages (0.896) (0.950) (0.654) (0.806) (0.545) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-value in parentheses  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section it is analysed whether the results are sensitive to relaxing the condition about what 
constitutes a privatisation. Also, it is analysed whether less severe economic crises impact the 
evidence in favour of the ‘economic crises induce reform hypothesis’. This provides a test of whether 
the hypothesis is falsifiable. Furthermore, other measures of the political variables are included to 
analyse whether the results are driven by the used variables.  
In the first part of the sensitivity analysis the assumption that privatisations have to be confirmed by 
evidence of de jure reforms is relaxed. That is, we rely solely on the privatisations detected by the 
statistical filter, see column 3 in table 2 above.5 This has some noteworthy implications. First, some 
of the privatisations used in the estimations might not be the result of planned policy. They could be 
the result of other factors such as exogenous shifts in consumer preferences or relative price 
movements. If that is the case we expect the precision of the estimates to decline.  
Table 7: Privatisations not validated as policy-induced, random-effects estimates 
Dependent variable: Detected privatisations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Job crisis 0.907** 0.901* 0.942* 0.904* 0.965** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) 
Debt crisis 1.165** 1.156** 1.003* 1.165** 1.016* 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.084) (0.037) (0.080) 
Annual recession  1.030** 1.090** 1.035** 1.032** 1.113** 
 (0.048) (0.039) (0.047) (0.048) (0.035) 
                                                        
5
 Another interesting endeavour is to analyse what effect it will have to use de jure privatisations as dependent 
variable. However, this is infeasible because it cannot be determined on the basis of de jure evidence alone whether 
a given reform is supposed to result in a privatisation, a nationalisation, or any. 
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Government ideologyt-1  0.154   0.194 
  (0.499)   (0.417) 
Government fractionalisationt-1   0.363  0.517 
   (0.660)  (0.542) 
Major cabinet changest-1    0.047 0.085 
    (0.908) (0.831) 
Inflation 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (0.532) (0.532) (0.493) (0.536) (0.518) 
Demographics 0.235** 0.225** 0.239** 0.234** 0.229** 
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) 
Technological change -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.337) (0.322) (0.781) (0.334) (0.786) 
Spline 1 0.059* 0.058* 0.054* 0.059* 0.053* 
 (0.063) (0.071) (0.088) (0.067) (0.095) 
Spline 2 -0.032* -0.031* -0.029 -0.032* -0.028 
 (0.071) (0.081) (0.105) (0.076) (0.116) 
Spline 3 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.162) (0.181) (0.241) (0.165) (0.270) 
Number of previous privatisations -0.080 -0.065 -0.061 -0.080 -0.021 
 (0.795) (0.831) (0.848) (0.797) (0.948) 
Time since last privatisation 1.587** 1.560* 1.501* 1.576* 1.486* 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.059) (0.052) (0.060) 
Constant -10.129*** -10.398*** -10.779*** -10.099*** -11.360*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
      
Observations 634 615 539 619 539 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Log-likelihood -97.27 -97.02 -95.99 -97.26 -95.64 
Wald-test of Mundlak averages (0.197) (0.286) (0.370) (0.247) (0.477) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-value in parentheses  
 
The results confirm the main findings of the baseline model in section 4. As expected the estimates 
are less precise compared to the baseline results, both in terms of significance of the crisis indicators 
and the log-likelihood. Also, there is evidence that adverse demographics trigger privatisations and 
not, as in the baseline case, that high inflation decreases the likelihood of privatisations. The 
economic controls are jointly significant at around the 5% level in all specifications, the duration 
variable at the 10% level in all specifications. The p-value of the Wald-test of the Mundlak (1978) 
averages provides evidence that the random-effects specification is consistent, and hence the most 
efficient estimator.  
It is interesting to investigate whether other measure of economic crisis impact the results. That is, 
whether measures for less severe economic crises will change the findings. To that end, the 
unemployment rate, government interest rate and growth rate are included in raw form, i.e. not 
dummies that are believed to capture severe crisis. Rodrik (1996) argues that reform following crisis 
is a tautology. The baseline random-effects estimates (table 6) provide support for such a claim since 
all proxies for economic crises significantly increase the likelihood of healthcare financing 
privatisation. Including measures that also capture lees severe economic crises shows that below 
average economic growth does not trigger privatisations (table 8). The remaining results confirm the 
baseline results. The p-value of the Wald-test of the Mundlak (1978) averages provides evidence that 
 16 
the random-effects specification is consistent, and hence the most efficient estimator. In sum, this 
provides evidence that the economic crises trigger reform hypothesis is not a tautology. Differences 
in severity of the crises have different effects. Therefore, the hypothesis can indeed be falsified since 
the most common indicator of macroeconomic performance only is a significant predictor when 
designed to capture severe economic crises.   
Table 8: Less severe economic crisis, random-effects estimates 
Dependent variable: De facto privatisations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Unemployment rate 0.165** 0.159** 0.159** 0.165** 0.156** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) 
Government interest rate 0.300** 0.307** 0.298** 0.305** 0.309** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Growth rate -0.125 -0.133 -0.129 -0.129 -0.139 
 (0.255) (0.229) (0.247) (0.244) (0.218) 
Government ideologyt-1  0.215   0.208 
  (0.459)   (0.501) 
Government fractionalisationt-1   -0.365  -0.148 
   (0.732)  (0.897) 
Major cabinet changest-1    -0.149 -0.177 
    (0.775) (0.737) 
Inflation -0.329** -0.347** -0.334** -0.335** -0.355** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Demographics 0.161 0.161 0.167 0.162 0.161 
 (0.214) (0.219) (0.200) (0.212) (0.224) 
Technological change -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.210) (0.271) (0.233) (0.203) (0.312) 
Spline 1 0.022* 0.020 0.022* 0.022* 0.021 
 (0.083) (0.114) (0.097) (0.096) (0.113) 
Spline 2 -0.015* -0.014 -0.015* -0.015* -0.014 
 (0.079) (0.106) (0.089) (0.089) (0.105) 
Spline 3 0.004* 0.004 0.004* 0.004 0.004 
 (0.093) (0.117) (0.098) (0.102) (0.119) 
Number of previous privatisations -0.821 -0.797 -0.931 -0.842 -0.849 
 (0.145) (0.160) (0.140) (0.138) (0.186) 
Time since last privatisation 0.807* 0.744 0.767 0.777 0.742 
 (0.094) (0.129) (0.120) (0.114) (0.129) 
Constant -7.761** -8.420** -7.433** -7.585** -8.223** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) 
      
Observations 634 615 539 619 539 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Log-likelihood -66.93 -66.60 -66.75 -66.84 -66.47 
Wald-test of Mundlak averages (0.710) (0.715) (0.619) (0.757) (0.663) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-value in parentheses  
 
As additional robustness checks several other commonly used measures for political factors was 
used. Concerning ideology, the index on ideological complexion of parliament and government by 
Woldendorp et al. (2000), used in many previous studies, was applied. Also, the index of average 
complexion of parliament constructed by Volkerink & de Haan (2001) was applied. They both turned 
out to be insignificant. Concerning government fractionalisation the number of spending ministers in 
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government was applied and turned out to be insignificant. Concerning political fractionalisation 
maximum ideological distance in the government was applied (see Mierau et al. 2007) and turned out 
to be insignificant. Lastly, concerning a new government or government executive, the occurrence of 
a legislative and executive election from Beck et al. (2001) was applied. These measures also turned 
out to be insignificant. The significance of the crisis indicators was unaffected by the inclusion of 
these alternative political variables.    
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper examines whether economic and/or political factors impact the likelihood of healthcare 
financing privatisations in OECD countries, a topic not investigated quantitatively thus far. A 
possible reason for this lack of research was the absence of a methodology with which gradual 
reforms in the healthcare financing sector can be identified. A main contribution of this paper is the 
development of such a methodology.  
The proposed methodology, a combination of structural break testing and validation of these breaks 
using de jure reforms, diminishes the probability of committing type I errors when identifying de 
facto reforms by assuring that they are the result of planned policy and are statistically significant at 
the same time. The sensitivity analysis shows that purely statistical identification of privatisations 
leads to imprecise estimates possibly caused by type I errors. These errors could be caused by 
exogenous shifts in consumer preference or relative price movements. Studies in other areas of the 
reform literature that rely solely on one of the two kinds of data to identify reforms are therefore 
likely to suffer from measurement error. Hence, the developed methodology should be applied in 
other areas of the empirical reform literature.   
There are two main empirical results. First, economic crises trigger healthcare financing 
privatisations, especially severe economic crisis. This result is in line with the findings of Drazen & 
Easterly (2001). It might seem that pure economic factors thrusts reform. However, the underlying 
explanation for this finding is mainly political.  
Second, political variables do not impact the likelihood of privatisations. Political ideology is not 
found to be a significant predictor of privatisations. Furthermore, the war of attrition hypothesis is 
often invoked to explain the delay of reform. No evidence is found in favour of this hypothesis 
either. Lastly, no support is found in favour of the hypothesis that newly elected governments enjoy a 
period where reform can be launched with lower political costs.  
If healthcare financing privatisations are seen as a means to improve fiscal balances the likelihood of 
achieving this is driven by economic crisis, and not pure political factors. Thus, the current crisis in 
many OECD countries might provide a window of opportunity to shift the costs of healthcare to the 
private sector.  
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Appendix 1a: Description of data used to identify privatisations 
Column 1 and 2 gives the country and sample length. Column 3 shows some basic time series properties. Underlined years in column 4 and 6 are the 
detected privatisations that can be validated by the qualitative evidence, the remaining cannot. These are also summarised in table 2 above when h=5. 
h=5 and h=6 indicate the trimming used when running the B&P-filter. Using a trimming equal to five generates the best congruence compared to the 
qualitative evidence. In most cases the policy change occurred one year prior to the detected privatisation, see the last three columns. Column 5 and 7 
shows detected nationalisations.  
Country  Time 
period 
Time series 
properties 
Detected reforms  Policy change: Privatisations 
h=5 h=6  
Qualitative evidence of reforms that affected healthcare financing 
h=5 
priv. 
h=6 
priv. priv. nat. priv. nat. 
Australia 1969-
2009 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
 1983  1983    
Austria  1960-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1968 
1988 
1974 
1980 
1996 
1967  
1988 
1974  
1980  
1996 
 Civil Servants’ Health and Work Accident Insurance Act of 1967 
 Act on Social Insurance for the Self-employed in Commerce, Trade and Industry Act on Social Insurance 
for Farmers Act on Social Insurance for Self-employed Freelancers of 1979 
 Employment and Social Security Tribunal Act of 1987 
    (HSiT 2006) 
1967  
1987 
1967 
1987 
Belgium 1995-
2010 
AR(0) 
No time trend 
       
Canada 1970-
2010 
AR(2)  
No time trend 
1985 
1993 
1974 1985  
1993 
1975  The Canadian Health Act of 1984 denies federal support to provinces that allow extra-billing within their 
insurance schemes and effectively forbids private or opted-out practitioners from billing beyond 
provincially mandated fee schedules. 
 Federal transfers frozen in 1990/1991. 
(HSiT 2005) 
1984 
1991  
1984 
1991 
Denmark 1971-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1983 
1989 
1975 
1998 
1983  
1989 
1976  
1998 
None of the reforms described in HSiT (2007) are near the dates of the identified privatisations.   
Finland 1960-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1992 1964 
1969 
1974 
2002 
1991 1965  
1974 
Milestones in the history of the Finish health care system: 
 The 90’s: Increasing deregulation and emphasis on municipal autonomy. Reforms in the state 
administration of health care, subsidy reform. Maintaining health care services during and after economic 
recession 
(HSiT 2008) 
1990’s 1990’s 
France 1990-
2010 
AR(1)  
No time trend 
2005 1994 2004 1995  The Health Insurance Act (no. 2004-810, 13 August 2004) 
 The health insurance vouchers plan of 2004. Aims: (1) extend the population that might benefit from 
voluntary health insurance, (2) offset the negative impacts of the threshold effect that occurred following 
the implementation of the universal Health Coverage Act dedicated to the poorest, and (3) start 
regulating the voluntary health insurance market. The voucher is a grant aiming at lowering the 
supplementary insurance contract cost. 
(HSiT 2010) 
2004 
2005 
2004 
2005 
Germany 1970-
2010 
AR(2) 
No time trend 
1982 
1997 
2003 
1974 
1991 
2002 1975  
1991 
 Health Insurance Contribution Rate Exoneration Act of 1996. Represented a shift from cost-containment 
to an expansion of private payments. Co-payments were viewed as way to put new money into the 
system. Further strengthened with First and Second Statutory Health Insurance Restructuring Acts of 
1997  
 Three months after the government was re-elected in September 2002, it introduced two reform bills with 
ad hoc austerity measures to reduce expenditure. The 12th SGB V Amendment Act froze ambulatory and 
hospital care budgets for 2003.  
(HSiT 2004) 
1996 
1997 
2002 
2003 
2002 
 
 21 
Country  Time 
period 
Time series 
properties 
Detected reforms  Policy change: Privatisations 
h=5 h=6  
Qualitative evidence of reforms that affected healthcare financing 
h=5 
priv. 
h=6 
priv. priv. nat. priv. nat. 
Greece 1987-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1993 1999 1993 1999  Law 2071 of 1992: modernization and organization of the health system.  The aim was to replace state 
responsibility with social security and the private sector in the delivery and financing of health services. 
Incentives to contract with private insurance were given. Co-payment rates for drugs, per diem hospital 
reimbursement and insurance contributions were increased. Furthermore, fees were introduced for visits 
to outpatient hospital departments as well as for inpatient admissions. Tax deductions for private 
insurance premiums were also adopted. A change in government impeded and revoked many of the 
above measures, Law 2194 of 1994. (HSiT, 2010)  
1992 1992 
Iceland 1960-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1983 
1991 
1996 
1965 
1971 
1976 
1983  
1992 
1965  
1971  
1977 
 The 1990 Health Care Act. Introduction of out-of-pocket user fees.   
(HSiT 2004) 
1990 1990 
Ireland 1960-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1984 1972 
1996 
1984 1972  
1996 
None of the major reforms described in HSiT (2009) are near the dates of the identified privatisations.   
Italy 1988-
2010 
AR(2)  
No time trend 
1993 2000 
2005 
1993 2000  1992–1993 The government approved the first reform of the national health system (Legislative Decrees 
502/1992 and 517/1993). This involved the start of a process of decentralizing health care powers to the 
regions and a parallel delegation of managerial autonomy to hospitals and local health units. The latter 
was envisaged within a broader model of internal market reform. During 1992–1993, co-payments were 
raised. 
 (HSiT 2009) 
1992 
1993 
1992 
1993 
Japan 1960-
2009 
AR(2) 
No time trend 
 1969 
1974 
1988 
1994 
 1969  
1975  
1988  
1994 
   
Luxembourg  1975-
2009 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1981 
1999 
1986 1980 
1999 
1986  1998: Legislation introducing insurance to cover the cost of long-term care.  The legislation introduced 
insurance covering home and institutional nursing care, rehabilitation, home aid, nursing appliances, 
counseling and other support for the elderly and the mentally and physically handicapped. The state pays 
45% of the cost of such care the remainder is met by the insured person. 
(HSiT 1999) 
1998 1998 
Netherlands 1972-
2002 
AR(2) 
No time trend 
1997 1976 1995 1977  1992 free choice of fund, end of uniform charges and mandatory contracting.  
 1993 prospective financing to funds. 
 1994 Van Otterloo Act: low-income pensioners became eligible for sickness funds, however 
other medium income pensioners lost this right. They now had to rely on private insurance.  
 1997. The threshold limit for access to sickness funds for pensioners was significantly raised. At 
the same time students could no longer be insured jointly under parent insurance. A system of limited 
user charges for sickness fund enrolees was introduced to give them an incentive to use health services 
more prudently. 
(HSiT 2004) 
1997 1994 
New Zealand 1970-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1989 1978 
2005 
1989 1978 
2004 
 A Public Finance Act 1989 that made sweeping changes to financial management in the public 
sector. Chief executives were made responsible for financial management; comprehensive new reporting 
requirements including statements of service performance; and more emphasis on performance indicators 
were introduced (HSiT 2001). 
1989 1989 
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Country  Time 
period 
Time series 
properties 
Detected reforms  Policy change: Privatisations 
h=5 h=6  
Qualitative evidence of reforms that affected healthcare financing 
h=5 
priv. 
h=6 
priv. priv. nat. priv. nat. 
Norway 1960-
2010 
AR(3)  
No time trend 
1979 
1988 
1965 
1971 
1979 
1988 
1965 
1971 
 As a result of the Municipalities’ Health Care Act (1982), responsibility for the primary health care in 
Norway was transferred to the municipalities in 1984. The government wanted with this act to coordinate 
the health and social services at the local level, strengthen these services in relation to institutional care, 
improve resource utilization, strengthen preventive care, and lay the foundation for better allocation of 
health care personnel. In 1987, the act was extended to include environmentally oriented health activities. 
In 1988 the Municipalities Health Care Act was further expanded when the responsibility of the counties’ 
nursing homes was transferred to the municipalities (HSiT, 2000, 2006). 
1987 
1988 
1987 
1988 
Portugal 1970-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1981 1975 
1989 
1995 
1981 1975 
1989 
1995 
None of the privatisations described in (HSiT 2006) are near the identified date.   
Spain 1960-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1988 
1994 
1966 
1972 
1977 
1988 
1994 
1966 
1972 
1978 
 In 1986 the General Health Care Act was approved. The process of devolving central public 
health powers to the regions was completed. 
 In 1987 health care powers were devolved to the Autonomous Communities of the Basque 
Country and Valencia. 
 In 1993 a selective list of pharmaceuticals was excluded from public funding for the first time. 
Free choice of GPs and paediatricians was generally introduced (piloted since 1984). 
  In 1994 an agreement was reached amongst the central government and the special Autonomous 
Communities on the regional resource allocation system, which involved the rationalisation of a set of 
previous piecemeal, bilateral agreements, and the commitment to renegotiate the terms of the agreement 
once every four years. 
(HSiT 2000) 
1986 
1987 
1993 
1994 
1986 
1987 
1993 
1994 
Sweden 1970-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
1984 
1990 
1995 
2000 
1974 1984 
1991 
2000 
1975  In 1994, the Family Doctor Act and the Act on Freedom to Establish Private Practice (1994) was 
introduced. However, in 1994, the Social Democrats returned to power, and, in June 1995, these two 
laws were withdrawn before they were fully implemented. Regardless of withdrawal, the Family Doctor 
Act, together with the Act on Freedom to Establish Private Practice, resulted in increased privatization of 
primary health care in some counties. 
 1998 Patients’ share of the drug costs was increased, as a result of a reformed National Drug Benefit 
Scheme. 
 1999 dental reform that meant an increase in patients’ co-payments.   
(HSiT 2005) 
1994 
1998 
1999 
1998 
1999 
Switzerland 1985-
2010 
AR(1) 
No time trend 
included 
 1990 
2000 
2005 
 1990 
1998 
2004 
 The health system has only been reformed in 1994 in the data period. The health insurance law made the 
purchasing of health insurance compulsory and made significant changes to the systems of subsidies 
within the system.  
(HSiT 2000) 
  
United 
Kingdom 
1960-
2010 
AR(2) 
No time trend 
1981 
1986 
1996 
1964 
1973 
2003 
1980 
1986 
1996 
1965 
1973 
2003 
 In1979 the government of Margaret Thatcher was elected. It was committed to a program of radical 
economic and social reform. This government saw public expenditure and state involvement as the 
source of Britain’s economic difficulties and embarked upon a major program of privatization. (there is 
no specific reference to healthcare financing reform)  
 In 1985, a Selected List Scheme was introduced restricting the range of medicines that are available 
through NHS prescriptions. 
 Between 1995-1999 problems with NHS covering dental services led many to take out private dental care 
insurance. (This was not the result of a reform as such.) 
  (HSiT, 1999)  
1979 
1985 
1979 
1985 
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Country  Time 
period 
Time series 
properties 
Detected reforms  Policy change: Privatisations 
h=5 h=6  
Qualitative evidence of reforms that affected healthcare financing 
h=5 
priv. 
h=6 
priv. priv. nat. priv. nat. 
United States 1960-
2010 
AR(3) 
No time trend 
included  
 1966 
1973 
1991 
2005 
 1966 
1973 
1991 
2004 
   
Data source for detected privatisations: OECD.org, Economic Outlook nr. 90. West German data is used prior 1990 for Germany.  
Data source for validated privatisations: WHO/ European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies country HSiT (Healthcare Systems in Transition) reports.   
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Appendix 2a: Graphs of the individual time series with segments and breaks 
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